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The concept of “operational code”，first proposed by Nathan Leites 
(1951) and further developed by Alexander George (1969) and Ole 
Holsti (1976a), refers to the two田tsof “philosophical”and “mstru-
mental”beliefs concernmg, among others, the nature of the political 
universe, the direction and control of historical development, and the cal-
culation and control of risks. The original version of the operational 
code by Leites was derived from his interpretation of出eBolshevik 
approach to politics and decision-making George revises Leites' version 
and classifies a political leader’S or an actor’s beliefs into ten categories of 
questions (five for each of the two田tsof ph!losoph1cal and instrumental 
beliefs) which, accordmg to one cntic伺olsti,1970), add町田 theessen-
tial and fundamental beliefs of an actor However, George’S ten catego-
ries of beliefs have not been operal!onalized, and, thus, studies applying 
the operational code approach have been largely confined to case studies 
of individual political leaders (Holsti, 1970; Mclellan, 1971; Anderson, 
1973; Gutierrez, 1973; Tweraser, 1973, Lawrence, 1975, Johnson, 1977, 
Walker, 1977). Furthermore, the highly abstract questions su銘estedby 
George are open to widely different mterpretat10ns As a result, most 
of the studies are descriptive in approach and hardly comparable; they 
are suggesl!ve and eclectic rather than focused and cumulativeσIolsti, 
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the M1dwe't Political Science Association, Chicago, April 20-23, 1978 
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1976b) Nevertheless, the George vemon remains the most commonly 
used by researchers applying the operational code approach. 
In an effort to improve the operational code approach, George and 
Holsti (1974) have attempted to enlarge and modify the earlier George 
version.τ"he result is a broader and more specific vemon of the opera-
tional code. By supplying coding guidelines, Holsti (1976a) has opera-
tionalized the beliefs through the technique of qu叩titativecontent 
analysis The present study adapts the Holsti vers10n to the Canadian 
context, with some significant modifications.τ"he most important 
difference between the Holsti version of the operational code and the 
one adopted here is the scale of measurement The present paper has 
attempted to operationalize the operational code beliefs by conceptual包ー
泊Eeach belief in a continuum，也us,rendering 1t mea四rableby a seven 
pomt differential scale In contrast, Holsti does not conceive each be-
lief in a contmuum, neither does he su毘estany standard dif免rential
measuring scale. There are also some important differences m terms of 
the contents of beliefs In many cases, the mod1ficat10ns are nece田ary
or desuable for applymg Holsti's version, originally conceptualized for 
content analysis, to the technique of questionnaire survey used in this 
study 
After the pre-tests of the questionna1田，someof the overly general 
白ldabstract questions were eliminated. The pre-tests were conducted 
pnor to the ma!lmg of the questionnaues. The author interviewed a 
number of Ottawa-based Canadian foreign service officers and inVlted 
血eucomme!l ts and四ggestionson the contents四 dwordmg of血e
questions The questionn出rewas also pre-tested by askmg some of my 
colleagues and graduate students to actually fil out the questionn剖res.
Despite the strenous efforts to designing and drafting the ques世onnaue,
the researcher was aware of the limitations of the method. For example, 
because of血elack of a feedback mechanism in a questionnaire即日・eyof 
this kind, we were not sure whether the questions had been interpreted 
correctly by the respondents, the validity of their answers was thus 
Mゆlysuspect. 
Moreover, beliefs loaded with heavy political or economic jargon, 
“Operational Code" Belief Systems 29 
which was generally vague and ambiguous to policy-makers, were also 
deleted. In general, complicated items from the Holsti framework were 
simplified (admittedly at the risk of over-simplification) for the sake of 
clarity. Finally, questions with low reliability were dropped. The split-
half reliability test was applied to al questions in the survey question-
naire. The completed questionnaires were randomly divided into two 
groups. The percent difference m medians in each scale from the two 
groups was regarded as a measure of unreliability; reliability was I minus 
this percent difference. Only beliefs with split-half reliability equal to or 
greater than 0.90 were included for data analysis. As a result, a total of 
thirty beliefs (eighteen philosophical beliefs and・ twelve instrumental 
beliefs) were included for the purpose of analysis in this paper. 
The. present study attempts to investigate the interrelationships 
町nong血eoperational code beliefs by the technique of correlation 
analysis; dimensions of the beliefs are then delineated by factor analysis. 
Moreover, by considering the operational code beliefs as dependent 
variables, it attempts to examlne the effects of enviromnent and role on 
one’s beliefs or perceptions. Due to the lack of appropriate literature on 
systematic applications of the ope削 ionalcode approach':' data analysis 
in the present paper relies heavily on inductive ra出町出andeductive 
reasoning The manner m which George’s ongmal ten categories of be-
liefs have been modified and adapted to the format of survey question-
naire is illustrated as follows: 
Philosophical Beliefs 
I What is the“essential”nature of the political universe? What is the 
nature of the contemporary international system? What is the funda-
mental character of one’s political opponents and/or of other sig凶－
ficant political actors? 
Pia Is politics basically conflictual or harmonious? (conflictual -
harmoruous）＂』
PJbー Onbalance, do you view conflict as a zero-sum situation (i.e., 
one actor's gain is another’s los) or as a non-zero-sum situa-
lion (i e., both parties may gain, or may lose)? (zero sum 
non-zero-sum) 
P1cー Doyou view conflict as functional in historical development 
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and progress, or is it dysfunctional? (functional -dysfunc-
tional) 
Pictーlsthe international system basically con日ictualor harmoni-
ous? (confhctual -harmonious) 
Pie ls conflict in the international system inevitable, or avoid-
able’（inevitable avoidable) 
Puー lsthe contempo四ryinternational system bi polarized or 
multi-polarized? (bi-polarity -muJti.』polanty)
PJgー Doyou agree that world peace could be achieved by-(a) 
Narrow担Ethe gap between the nch and the poor countries? 
(b) Maintaining good personal relations among world leaders' 
(c) Transforming the existing struc加reand functioning of the 
system by designing a new world order? (strongly agreeー
、＂＇strongly disagree) 
P1hー Interms of international influence, what is the nature of the 
U.S. fundamental foreign policy goals? (aggressive -status 
quo) 
Pu What are the major sources of the U.S. foreign policies? Are 
they initiated by internal needs and d1spos1tions, or primarily 
r田ponsesto external or situational constraints? (internal 
needs -external constraints) 
P1j Are the United States’foreign actions made by intuition, or by 
precise calculation? (intuition precise calculation) 
2 What are the prospects for the eventual r田lizationof one’s funda-
mental political values and aspirat10ns? Can one be optimistic, or 
must one be pess1m1stic on this score; and in what respects the one 
and/or the other? 
P2a In terms of international influence, what is the nature of 
Canada’s fundamental foreign pohcy goals? (aggressive -status 
quo) 
P2b - What are the major sources of Canada’s foreign policies? Are 
they initiated by internal needs and d1spos1llons, or primarily 
responses to external or situational constraints? (internal 
needs external constraints) 
P2cー Ingeneral, will Canada play a more (or less) important inter-
national role in the future' (more important -less important) 
P2ct - Are you optimistic or pessimistic regarding the prospects for 
the realization of the following Canadian foreign policy goals: 
(a) Fostering economic growth? (b) Safeguarding sovereignty 
and mdependence? (c) Workmg for peace and security? (d) 
Promoting social justice? (e) Enhancing the quality of lifeワ
(f) Ensu出1ga harmonious na回目lenvironment? (optimistic 
、＂》pe田imistic}
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3. Is the politic困 futurepredictable? In what sense and to what extent? 
"' What is the role of chance m human affairs and history’ 
P3a Is politics characterized by uncertainty, or is it more or less 
predictable? (unpredictable -predictable) 
P3b - Are the duection and final outcome of the m可orhistorical 
developments predictable? (unpredictable -predictable) 
P30 - Are specific short-term policy outcomes predictable? (unpre-
dictable -predictable) 
4 How much “control”or“mastery”can one have over historical de-
velopment? 
P4 - Should one make foreign policies by mtmtion, or by precise 
calculation? (intuition -precise calculation) 
Instrumental Belieβ 
I. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives of political 
action? 
l1a Should foreign policy goals be worked out withm an overall 
comprehensive framework, or by separating issues and dealmg 
with each one on its own term (i. e , piecemeal approach)? 
(comprehensive -piecemeal) 
lib Should one select optimal goals, or is it better to settle for 
those that seem more attainable in the prevatling circum-
stances? (optimal go剖s-attamable goals) 
I le- Are foreign pohcy goals compatible (i e., they are linked in 
such a way that achievement of one wtll ensure, enhance, or 
at least not harm the prospects for success in others), or in-
compatible (i e , the vigorous pursuit of one goal may ret町d
or even jeopardize the achievement of others)? (compatible -
incompatible) 
2. How are the goals of political action pursued most effectively? 
l2aー Indealmg with foreign policy problems, should one adopt an 
incremental approach by emphasizing the value of ・limited 
gams on var旧usparts of the problem, or adopt a blitzkrieg 
strategy by committmg a decisive and full-scale effort to deal 
with the problem? (incremental blitzkrieg) 
l2b - In general, which action is preferable for achieving Canada’s 
foreign policy goals? (bilateral -multilateral) 
3 How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and ac-
cepted? 
l3a - Should one calculate the risks of policies within a comprehen 
sive framework m relat10n to al of one’s goals and aspirations, 
or should one do so by asse田ingthe risks solely in terms of the 
specific tactics that may be pu四uedin a given situation? 
(comprehensive -specific) 
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I3b -When Canada 1s confronted with high-risk policies, should 
Canada take the initiative or adopt the tactic of wait-and-seeワ
(take mihat1ve -wait-and-see) 
l3c - Do you agree with the following statement・ Certain circum-
stances make high-nsk policiee conceivably advisable? (strong-
ly agree strongly disagree) 
l3dー Isit safe for a small power to pursue m町orforeign policy 
objectives or goals at the expense of a 田町orpower? (very safe 
overly nsky) 
4. What is the best “timmg”of action to advance one's interests? 
4 ー lsthe“l!mmg”。faction important for the success or failure 
of one’s long-term, fundamental goals? ls the “I ming”of 
action important for the success or fatlure of specific under-
takings? (very unimportant very 1mportantj＇》
5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s 
mterests? What resources can one draw upon in an effort to advance 
one’S mterests? 
Isa What is血eutility of different means for advancing one's 
mterests? (ends justify means means consistent with ideals) 
isb What are the key resources that consl!tute politically relevant 
power m world pohtics? Is power best conceived stnctly in a 
military sense, or in a broader definition to mclude economic, 
diplomatic and other resources? (military capability broader 
perspective) 
Findmgs reported in this paper are based on data from a question-
naire survey of foreign service officers (FSO) in Canada’s Department of 
External Affairs (DEA). Studies applying the operational code approach 
have so far been confined to case studies of a lunited number of top level 
decis10n-m叫冊目. Although some scholars have focused on investigating 
the beliefs and attitud田 oflarger samples of politiciansσutman, 1973), 
few have been pr泊四rilyconcerned with belief systems of bureaucrats 
Recent studies have demonstrated the impact of bureaucratic politics on 
the process of decision-makmg (Aliison, 1971; Alhson and Halperin, 
1972), Canadian dipfomats, m particular, are Mゆly担日uentialin for-
mulating and implementing血eircountry’s foreign policies. The litera-
ture on Canadian diplomacy is voluminous, yet scholarly work on 
bureaucratic beliefs and attitudes 1s scarce. The present study is one of 
the latest attempts to白Hthis gap':' The survey was conducted by the 
“Operational Code”Belief Systems 3 
author himself during the spring and summer of 1977. Questionnaires 
were sent to a random sample of 200 FSO盟問ingab road and 200 
Ottawa-based FSO. A total of ninety-two respondents (a response rate of 
23%) completed and returned the qu田tionnair田.Thirty-eight ( 41.3%) 
of the responden臼werestationed abroad, while fifty.four (58.7%) were 
servmg m Ottawa when the survey was conducted'." Foreign service 
officers of different ranks were well represented About half of the 
respondents were junior officers, one quarter were mid-career officers; 
and another quarter were semor diplomats, serving either as ambassadors 
abroad or division heads in the DEA in Ottawa. The proportion of re-
spondents corresponded approXImately to the population of FSO; only 
the senior diplomats were slightly over-represented. 
According to comments and suggestions from both the respondents 
and non-respondents (about 15% of the non-respondents replied but 
declined to parl!cipate m the survey), the relatively low response rate 
could be explained by (!) the highly abstract and sometimes over-
simplified qu田tionswhich some FSO had difficulties in answering；，ο） 
the prevailing negative attitudes among FSO towards questionnaire 
surveys conducted by the academia; and (3) the lack of strong evidence 
demonstrating policy relevance of the research project The response 
rate, however, may be regarded as satisfactory when compared to re-
search of similar kind. In a survey of political elite attitudes, a response 
rate as low as 16.7% was reported (Modelski, 1970). In any case, the 
problems of non-response bias may not be severe due to the very nature 
of the present study This paper does not intend to generalize about the 
belief systems of the population based on data from 23% of the sample, 
an attempt which wil no doubt be jeopardized by the low response rate. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the ef品ectsof non-respondent bias 
would be much les serious on changing the underlying mterrelationships 
among the belief systems, which is the primary concern of this study 
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CORRELATES OF OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEMS 
Results from correlation analysis md1cate some mterrelat10nships 
田nongthe beliefs. However, not al operational code beliefs are signifi-
cantly related to each other, most of the correlations are in general weak 
In fact, the striking picture of the correlal!on matrix is the lack of 
relationships among m阻 y,if not most, of the behefs (see Table I) More 
sigruficantly, perhaps, 1s the lack of “core”beliefs which may affect or 
constrain the range of responses to other questions that compose the 
operational code; instead, small “clusters”of beliefs were found consist-
ing of three or four beliefs. According to Converse (1964), a belief 
system is defined as“a configuration of ideas and attitudes m which the 
elements are bound together by some form of constramt or functional 
interdependence ”The above fmdings raise serious questions about the 
basic conceptual assumption of the operat10nal code approach that there 
are systematic linkages between beliefs and thus threaten the ut姐ityof 
the construct as a way of describing belief systems. The findings also cast 
doubt on current efforts toward developing a typology of operational 
code belief systems by assu即時thatwithin one’s system of beliefs there 
is a hierarchy由atr叩 gesfrom the most import叩tto the least import-
ant beliefs (Holsti, 1977). 
Table I presents the product-moment correlation coefficients of the 
thirty operational code beliefs. It shows small “clusters”of beliefs with 
significant correlations (at the 0.05 level) between each other. It is in-
terestmg to note that most of these clusters of beliefs constitute both 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs, suggesting interdependence be-
tween the two sets of beliefs This finding has illustrated the structuring 
complexity of the opera世onalcode belief system, it raises questions 
about the criteria that artificialy distinguish the philosophical and in-
strumental beliefs. Moreover, it casts doubt on the validity of the con-
ceptual construct and suggests that there may be some other basic values 
or primordial beliefs which structure the system and出atshould be in-
eluded Attempts to explain political behavior by the operational code 
“Operational Code" Belief Systems 35 
construct are therefore bound to be partial and incomplete Notwith-
standing the above llimtattons, there are some revealing hnkages町nong
the beliefs. It is not the author’s intent10n, however, to list al the 
significant correlations; only those with relatively strong hnkag由。e.,
with correlation coefficients, or“rぺequalto or greater than .30) are 
cited selectively below＇.』
It ts obvious that one’s belief about the nature of politics ts expected 
to be related to one’s belief about the nature of the internat10nal system. 
Indeed, when a person perceives political life as basically conflictual he 
tends to perceive the international system as basically conflictual (r = 
.37)'.' Less obviously, perhaps, is the relationship between one’s belief 
about the role of confhct in historical development and one’s belief 
about the prospect of achievmg world peace. The correlation (r = 35) 
suggests that when a person perceives that conflict is functional in 
historical development he is likely to be more optimistic about world 
peace. Even more subtle is the relat10nship between one’s belief about 
world peace叩dthe preferred tactics for advancing one's interests; 
people who believe that means employed m pursumg policy goals should 
be consistent with onぬ idealsare likely to be more optimistic about the 
conditions for atta加ingworld peace (r = -33). Optimism about achiev-
ing world peace could probably be explamed by one’s confidence m in-
ternational negotiations. A person’s beliefs in the functional role of 
conflict in historical development and the flexibility of employing differ” 
ent means for advancing mterests (vis-a-vis the rigid“hawk”stand of 
“ends-justify-m岡田”） appa回目lyimply a strong belief in po阻 bleac” 
complishments through negotiattons. It 1s thus not surprismg to find the 
above two beliefs related to the belief about condit10ns for world peace 
It is interesting to know how a foreign service officer's images of 
the United States, Canada’s predominant neighbour, are related to his 
other operational code beliefs. As one may expect, an officer who 
perceives that the nature of Canada’s fundamental foreign policy goals 
is to maintain the status quo is likely to perceive similar U.S. interests to 
mamtain the status quo (r = .31）百四tendsto confum a hypothesis sug-
gested by percept10n studies出atactors who fmd themselves havrng 
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shared interests with other actors have a tendency to over-estimate the 
degree of common mterest mvolved (Jervis, 1969) Furthermore, an 
officer’s perception of the United States foreign pohcy making process 
is associated with his belief about the predictab山tyof politics; that is, 
one who believes that politics is more or les predictable tends to per-
ce1ve that the U. S foreign policies are made by precise calculation 
rather than by intuitive thinking (r = .38). Apparently, there is a strong 
tendency for people to ass1mdate incoming information and toおrm
new images such as that of other actors consistent to pre-existing images 
(J erv.民 1976:117). 
A distinctive structure of interdependence apparently ・exists in the 
area of one’s beliefs concerning the eventual realization of fundamental 
goals and aspirations. Foreign service officers who perceive a les llport-
ant international role for Canada m the future tend to be pessimistic 
regarding the prospects for the realization of Canadian foreign policy 
goals (r = 50) and appear to be satis白edwith maintainmg the status quo 
(r = 37). Furthermore, people who are pessimistic about the realization 
of policy goals are likely to perceive the incompatib出tyamong goals 
(r = 32), warnmg that vigorous pursuit of one goal may retard or even 
jeopardize the achievement of others. 
A similar distmctive structure of interdependence also appears to 
exist m beliefs concerning the predictab白tyof pohtics and lustorical 
developments. When a person believes that the direction and final 
outcome of m句orhistoncal developments are predictable, he is more 
likely to believe that politics is more or les predictable (r = .38). A 
person who believes in the predictability of history also seems to have 
more confidence m controllmg histoncal development by precise calcula-
tion while formulating foreign pohcies (r = .3), strategically he prefers 
bilateral over multilateral actions in pu日uingforeign policy goals (r = 
29), assuming probably one can have a better control over the outcome 
of bilateral actions than multilateral actions. 
It is somewhat surpnsing, however, to find a much les d1stmctlve 
structure of interdependence among beliefs concerning risk calculation. 
Nevertheless, there is a fauly strong relationship between risk assessment 
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and the willingness to t紘erisks (r = .39). People who believe that one 
should assess the risks of foreign policies within a comprehensive frame-
work in relation to al of one’s goals and aspi四tionsseem to have more 
confidence m coping with ri北sand tend to agree白atcertain c1rcum-
stances make high-risk policies conceivably advisable; conversely, people 
who believe that one should 師団田 policynsks solely in terms of the 
specific tactics that may be pursued in a given situation tend to be more 
cautions and出卸kthat one should avoid high-risk policies under al 
cucumstances 
DIMENSIONS OF OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEMS 
By using the technique of principal component factor analysis, this 
section attemps to delineate the major dunensions of the operational 
code belief systems. Table 2 presents the rotated factor matnx using the 
varimax orthogonal rotatrnn＇！” The varimax rotation delineates eleven 
distincl!ve factors or dimensions of the operatrnnal code construct (I) 
optimism/pessimism，。）policy strategy and tactics，。）risks calculation, 
(4) compatibility of goals, (5) U.S. policy calculation, (6) timing of 
actions, (7) nature of poli世田，（8)nature of conflict, (9) control of 
undertakings, (10) control of history，阻d(11) small power strategy. 
The presence of eleven, ra血erthan two or three, distinctive factors 
clearly suggests that the operational code 1s multi-dimensional; the 
lack of do凶 nantfactors (none of the factors accoun臼 formore than 
ten percent of the variance) supports our earlier conclusion about由e
lack of“core”beliefs担 theope阻tionalcode construct A closer look 
at the variable loadings on each factor wtl certainly reveal some unport-
ant theore!Jcal implical!ons 
I. Optimism」pessimism
The three mter-related philosophical beliefs concerning the nature 
of Canada’S fundamental foreign pohcy goals, prospects for the eventual 
realization of her foreign policy goals, and aspirations of Canada playmg 
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an important international role al have significant loadings on this drmen-
sion (see Table 2, .66, .65 and .46 for P2a. P2c and P2d respectively, 
which correspond to the above three beliefs）＇岨 Beliefswhich have lower 
but sig即日cantloadings on吐lisdimension are a person’s image of the 
nature of U.S. forei伊 policygoals ( 40) and his preferred tactic in pursu-
ing policy goals by bilateral or multilateral actions ( .31 ). Apparently, a 
person’s optimistic/pessimistic outlook must have回meeffects on his 
percept10ns of other actors’intent and his own belief about the best 
tactics in pursuing desirable goals. 
2. Policy strategy and tactic 
Both the belief about the be喝tapproach for selecting goals and 
the belief about the most effective action in pursumg those goals have 
high loadings on this factor (.57 and -.52 respectively). People who are 
satisfied with settlmg for attainable goals seem to adopt an incremental 
approach m pursuing those goals, on the other hand, people who suggest 
that one should select optimal goals tend to adopt a blitzkrieg strategy 
by comnntting a decisive and full-scale effort to pursue their o切ec!Ives.
The belief about the best tactic when one is confronted with high-risk 
policies (i.e., whether one should take the imtiative or adopt the tactic 
of wait-and剖 e)also has sigmficant loading (.45) on this dimens10n 
Furthermore, it 1s mteresting to血1dthat b ehefs concerning the struc-
ture of the international system and the conditions for world peace have 
significant loadings on this factor 十.32and .36 respectively). This 
suggests that a person tends to perceive some interrelationslups between 
the structure of the global system, conditions leading to world peace, and 
the appropnate strategies and tactics for the realization of world peace 
and other objectives. 
3 Risks calculation 
The two beliefs which have the highest loadings on this factor are 
the beliefs about the appropriate approach (comprehensive vis-a－吋s
specific) to asse田therisks of policies (.64) and the permi田ib血tyof high-
risk policies (.60) It 1s mterestmg to find that both a person’s percept10n 
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of the major sourc田 ofhis own country’s foreign policies and his percep-
t10n of other country’s (ie., the United States) policy sour田shave sig-
nificant ]oadmgs on this “risks calculation" dimension (.38 and .43 
respectively). The positive signs of the factor loadings sugg白tthat one 
tends to be more specific in a田町singthe nsks of policies and more 
cautious in employing high-risk policies when one believes that the m吋or
sources of country’s foreign policies are primarily responses to external 
or situational constraints 
4. Compatibility of goals 
The belief about the compatib日ityof foreign policy goals (i.e., 
whether the acluevement of one goal w!ll e出anceor jeopardize the 
prospects for success in others) stands out as the dominant variable m 
this factor as indicated by its high loading (.69). With lower but signi-
ficant factor loadings on this dimension are one’s optimistic/pessimistic 
attitude towards the realization of foreign policy goals ( 39) and o問、
belief about the predictability of the political universe (.42). Underly-
ing this dimension is an important theorel!cal implication suggesting 
that people who believe m the uncertainty of the political uruverse tend 
to perceive血eincompatibility of policy goals and are likely to be 
pessimistic about the reahzat10n of those goals 
5. U.S. Policy calculation 
This factor is best characterized by one’s nnage of the United States 
pohcy formulat10n pro問団（intuitivethinking vis-a-vis precise calculat10n) 
as suggested by the high loading (.74) of this variable. Other variables 
which could be categorized under吐出 dimensionare one’s perception 
regarding the 恒例'itability/avoidabilityof conflict in the international 
system and a person’s preferred tactics for advancing his own country’s 
interests as indicated by the significant loadings of these two variables 
on the factor (.50 and .41 respectively). Underlying也isdimension is 
the implical!on出atone who believes白atconflict泊 theinternational 
system could be avoided by a flexible and compromising strategy of 
fully utilizing available means tends to perceive也ata m句oractor such 
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as the United States could pursue its goals successfully by following such 
a strategy with precise policy calculations. 
6. Timing of actions 
This is a unique factor in the sense that the only variable which 
ha~， high loading on the dimension is the加port叩 ceof“timing”of 
actions for the succe田 offoreign policy goals or specific undertakings. 
Indeed, its factor loading of .79 is the high田tin the factor matrixぐTable
2). The only other variable which has somewhat significant loading (.30) 
on the dimension IS one’s belief about one’s own country’s foreign policy 
sources; its positive factor loading suggests that a person who perceives 
external constraints as the major sources of foreign policies tends to 
regard也e“t面白E”ofact10ns as important for the success of policy 
objectives. One pla田ibleexpl印刷onmay be that an actor tends to be 
more cautious about the “nght”time (e.g・to“seizethe hour”） for 
responding to external afairs when he perceives that policies are largely 
constrained by external situations 
7. Nature of politics 
Amongst出es皿variableswhich have significant loadings on this 
factor, the beliefs about the conflictual/harmomous nature of politics 
and出atof the international system have the highest loadings (.53 and 
.74 respectively) Vanables which have lower but nevertheless sigmficant 
factor loadings are the following beliefs P1cー thefunctional or dys-
functional role of conflict in historical development (.30); P3a -the 
predictab出tyof politics (-.32); P3b -the predictability of m吋orhistori-
cal developments (-.33); and l2bー thepreference for bilateral or multi-
lateral approach to pursuing foreign policy goals (.36). Apparently, a 
person's fundamental belief about the nature of the political universe has 
pervasive effects on some rmport叩tcomponents of both philosophical 
and instrumental beliefs The generally low factor loadmgs of the above 
variables, however, do not warrant the decision of choosing one’s belief 
about the nature of politics as出e“masterbelief" of the operational 
code construct (Holsti, 1977). 
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8. Nature of conflict 
Like factor 6 （“timing”of act10ns), this could be regarded as a 
unique factor. One’s per田ptionof conflict situat10n (zero-sum vis-a-vis 
non zero-sum) 1s the dominant variable in this dimens10n as indicated by 
its high loading (.68). The only other variable which has significant load-
ing (.43) on出efactor is a person’S mstrumental belief about the pre-
ferred tactics for advancing one’s interests. The posilive factor loadmgs 
of the two vanables suggest that people who view conflict as basically a 
non-zero sum situat10n tend to thi此！出atone should employ me叩S
consistent with one’s ideals for international bargainings and negolia-
lions 
9. Control of undertakings 
The special feature of this dunension 1s血elack of dominant vari-
ables; none of the four vanables categorized in the dimension has sigmfi-
cant白ctorloading exceedmg .50. Nevertheless, this factor is obviously 
characterized by the belief about the predictability of specific short-term 
policy outcomes and one’S confidence in various undertakings to achieve 
world peace as indicated by their factor loadings (.48 and -.46 respec-
tively) It is mteresting to note that factor loadmgs a日 alsosigmficant 
in beliefs about the role of conflict泊historicaldevelopment （四 39)and 
the tactics to tackle high-risk policies (.40). The configuration of beliefs 
composing this factor su路eststhat people who perceive a functional 
role for conflict in history tend to have more confidence in men’s power 
and capability to control the outcomes of specific policy undertakmgs, 
to achieve world peace under favourable conditions, and to wait for 
the most opportune tune to tackle h1gh-nsk policies 
10. Control of his臼りF
Unlike the preceding factor, this dimens10n is dominated, as ind1-
cated by the1f respeclive loadmgs, by the two closely related variables, 
namely, the perception of the direction and final outcome of m吋or
historical developments (.47) and the belief about policy calculation 
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(.75). The presence of only two variables泊 thisdimension has import-
ant theoretical implications. It suggests that a political leader’s attitudes 
and strategies toward policy formulation could be partly explained and 
predicted by his philosophical belief about one’s role m“movmg” 
history, as demonstrated by a recent study on Henry Kissinger's opera-
tional code (Walker, 1977). 
11. Small power strategy 
The last factor is characterized by the high loading (-.60) of one's 
belief about policy strategy for a small power to pursue policy objectives 
under the dominant influence of a major or super power The other two 
variables which have significant loadings on this drmension are the per” 
ception of the functional role of conflict in historical development (.37) 
and the belief about the best approach in selecting policy go必（.41).By 
considering the above three variable collectively, this dimension implies 
that people who regard conflict as dysfunctional m histoncal progress 
tend to believe that a small power could avoid direct confrontation with 
a m句orpower by a cautions and piecemeal approach m selecting its pohcy 
objectives (i.e, by separatmg policy issues and dealmg with each one on 
its own term). 
ENVIRONMENT, ROLE, AND PERCEPTIONS 
Students of political leaders generally agree that an actor’S加ages
are subject to mfluence by the environment or st加uliand his role m the 
decision-making hierarchy. But they differ widely on how and the degree 
to wiuch an actor's beliefs are affected by his role and his working en-
vironment. In his study of presidential styles, Barber (1968) ob田円出
that personality formation is a long, developmental process, subject to 
change dunng onぬ lifetrme. Barber su飽ests,however, that由em句or
elements of a leader’s style and personality are exhibited during his first 
independent political success, when he emerges as a mature young adult. 
Results from a comparative case study (Johnson, 1977) on Senator 
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Frank Church’s operational code during the two different periods (m 
1956 and 1972 respectively) tend to support Barber’s hypothesis. The 
Church example suggests血atthe fundamental behefs of the operat10nal 
code may develop early in the career and endure with a few exceptions 
Many of Church’S 1972 instrumental beliefs, however, appear to be a 
product of the Vietnam experience and the thawmg of the Cold War. 
Lyon and Leyton Brown (1977) go even further, drawing conclusions 
from interviewing data on Canadian elite加agesof the international 
system they su飽estthat rmages are strongly influenced by the envuon-
ment and roles with which the individual is currently afl tliated Other 
studies by scholars m internat10nal relat10ns {Rosenau, 1968; Jems, 
1969, 1976) have also noted the impact of past and凶mediateexperi-
ence on a leader’s perceptions and behavior. 
Results from the present study support the contention that an 
actor’s beliefs and perceptions are substantially influenced by the en-
vironment and his role m the organizational umt. For the purpose of 
examining the impact of environment on a foreign service officer's per-
ceptions, the respondents are divided担totwo groups, namely, those 
stationed abroad and those 田町田gm Ottawa. Some of the important 
different perceptions between the two groups of respondents are cited 
as follows Officers serving abroad, for example, as compared to those 
Ottawa-based, are mo田 likely(by a ratio of three to two) to perceive 
conflict as a non-zero-sum situation playing a functional role m h!Ston-
cal development and progress. From their experience in dealing with 
foreign diplomats, FSO serving abroad probably realize, more than their 
counterparts m Ottawa, the importance of negotiation (a non-zero-s凹n
E嗣 e）泊 solvinginternational conflict. Moreover, FSO serving abroad 
seem to have somewhat more confidence m pred1ctmg politics and policy 
outcomes of specific undertakings, they are also more optimistic about 
the realization of Canadian foreign policy goals, particularly the pros-
pects for safeguarding Canadian sovereignty and independence and the 
aspirations of enhancing the quality of life for al Canadians. This, taken 
collectively, su路eststhat FSO serving abroad are characterized by their 
generally liberal and progressive outlook as compared to their more con-
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se四allveand p回目maticcolleagues in Ottawa. This could probably be 
explained partly by their different perceptions of the m句orsources of 
Canada’s foreign policies About two-thirds of Canadian diplomats 
serving abroad perceive internal needs and dispositions as essential moti-
vations behind Canadian fo田ignpolicy initiatives while only slightly 
more than one-third of those Ottawa-based diplomats白血kso, in fact, 
about half of由eFSO serving in Ottawa believe that Canadian foreign 
policies are pnmarily responses to external or situat10nal constramts 
Confidence m one's own capabilities and policy initiatives, such as 
that po田essedby a majority of Canadian diplomats serving abroad, 
certainly contributes to one’s optimism in negotiations and eventual 
reahzation of pohcy objectives. 
No les s1gni白cantis the impact of role on an actor’s percept10ns 
The respondents, for ex白nple,are <thnost evenly split on the conditions 
for achieving world peace However, the percentage of junior foreign 
田rviceofficers who agree that world peace can .be achieved under the 
prescribed conditions, particularly through the effort to narrow the gap 
between the rich and the poor countries, is much higher than that of the 
mid-career and senior diplomats (by a ratio of two to one). In addition, 
a much larger portion of junior FSO (about 50%) tend to perceive that 
the direction and final outcome of the major historical developments are 
more or les predictable; les than one-third of those mid-career and 
盟国ordiplomats believe泊 thepredictab出tyof history. The belief in 
human capability in predicting or“mo吋ng”historycorresponds to a 
preva出ngattitude田nongtwo-thirds of the iunior officers toward for-
mulating policies by precise calculat10ns, about half of the mid-career 
officers and somewhat les th阻 halfof也esenior diplomats would 
choose this strategy. Moreover, about 55% of the junior officers prefer 
bilateral action in pursumg Canadian foreign policy goals while only one-
third of the senior diplomats would choose such an action; the majority 
of the mid-career and senior officers tend to prefer a Ill!Xed or multi-
lateral approach to foreign policy actions. Finally, more than 60% of吐1e
junior officers perceive internal needs as the m句orsources of Canada’s 
foreign policies; an almost equal percentage of senior officers regard their 
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own country’S foreign policies as primarily responses to external or 
situat10nal constraints (about 20% of the FSO m al ranks perceive a 
mixed pohcy sources) The semor diplomats' perceptions of external 
constraints on Canadian foreign policies probably explaln their generally 
conservative and pragmatic outlook in pursuing Canadian ob1ectiv田
CONCLUSION 
Relying on data from a questionn剖resurvey of Canadian foreign 
service officers, the present study has explored the interrelationships 
田nongbeliefs and the dimensions of the operational code construct. The 
results only partially support也egeneral assumption prevail担gh 血e
cognitive approach literature that collectively an actor's beliefs are 
related to each other; the findings have also failed to indicate any dis-
cermble hierarchy of beliefs in the operational code construct. The 
multidimensional featu,es of the code suggest that it is not composed of 
a single set of interdependent vanables, but “clusters”of mterdependent 
variables unrelated to each other. The lack of “core”or“master”beliefs 
connectmg or constrainmg other behefs m the construct does not, of 
course, necessanly preclude the presence of “core”behefs among the 
various dimensions. Some of the beliefs such as the nature of politics and 
the internat10nal system，出enature of conflict, compatibility of goals, 
timing of act10ns, and risk a田e田mentcould be re伊rdedas“core”beliefs 
in theu respective dnnens10ns In addition, it is possible that some of the 
operational code beliefs are mdeed“core”beliefs血atmay influence 
other primordial beliefs or basic values excluding from the conceptual 
construct 
The substantial impact of role and enviromnent on perceptions, as 
indicated by the results of this study, supports世田 contentionthat an 
actor’s operational code is best understood by invesugating his more 
complete, evolving record over白eyears rather由anreliance on an ex-
amination of a single period (Johnson, 1977). One must also be cautious 
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m assuming direct linkages between beliefs and actions in foreign policy 
because of the unstable nature of the belief systems and the generally 
subtle and indirect role of beliefs in policy making (Holsti, 1976b ).In 
short, we should not regard an operational code as a p阻acea・itsex-
planatory and predictive power for the subiect’s decision-making be-
havior may not be overwhehning (George, 1975) 
A probably more fruitful and logical area for exploration is to 
ex副nmethe linkages between a person’s operational code beliefs and 
his attitude toward specific foreign policy issues In pursu血Esuch an 
effort, the researcher included a number of questions concerning Ame-
rican-Canadian relations on the survey quest10nnaire. The respondents 
were requested to indicate in a seven-point scale whether they agree or 
disagree with the followmg statements: (I) Canada’s national担terests
should be essentially s泊1ilarto those of the United States; (2) foreign 
policy independence is an illus10n in contemporary world politics; (3) 
relat10ns of mterdependence are the situat10ns within which weaker 
powers must normally operate; and (4) we are so dependent on the 
Americ叩 economythat we cannot afford to try to in日uenceAmerican 
foreign policies by publicly opposmg them 
Results suggest that Canadian五oreignservice officers who favour 
an mcremental and pragmatic approach to dealmg with foreign policy 
issues tend to agree that Canada’s national mterests should be essentially 
s面ilarto those of the United States; conversely, officers who would 
prefer a more aggressive and decisive st田tegyare hkly to disagree The 
product”moment correlat10n coefficient (r = .34) suggests that the above 
H出ageis qmte strong. Equally strong relationships have been found 
between a person’s concept of independent foreign policy and his phi-
losophical belief about policy calculation (r = .32) and instrumental 
belief about small power policy strategy (r ＝日.40).The nature of the 
relat10nships implies that people who believe that one should make 
foreign policies by precise calculations and that it is safe for a small 
power to pursue foreign policy objectives at the expense of a m司or
power are likely to opt for an independent foreign policy for Canadians. 
It IS lillportant, perhaps,. to note that there is a fairly strong and sigmfi-
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C阻trelationship (r ~ -.35) between an officer's perception of Canadian 
foreign pohcy sources and his concept of mterdependence m the con-
temporary international system；泊 generalofficers who believe that 
Canada’s foreign pohcies are initiated by mternal needs rather than 
responses to external constraints are more skeptical about the proposi-
lion出atties of interdependence guarantee feeble powers such as Canada 
against arbitrary actions by the strong (e.g., the United Stat田）.Finally, 
officers who believe in a more aggressive Canadian foreign policy and 
conceive power in world politics from a broader perspective are likely to 
have more confidence加 Canada’Scapability to oppose publicly Ameri-
C叩 foreignpolicies (product-moment correlations are -.27 and .27 
respectively). 
The reader may have noted that al the above beliefs which have 
sigrnficant effect on a Canadian foreign service officer's attitudes toward 
Amencan-Canadian relations are components of different dimensions in 
the operational code construct. This su銘es臼thatone’s attitudes or con-
cepts regarding a particular policy domain are subject to influence by 
vanous dimensions of the construct；由enature of the policy issues is the 
m司ordeterminant of how and the extent to which a person’s concepts 
are H此 edto his operational code beliefs目 Conceptually，吐出 suggests
that it may be worthwhile to explore the linkages between beliefs of the 
operational code and the concepts related to a particular policy domam; 
the bndge between the operat10nal code and cognitive mapping ap-
proaches (Aぷelord,1976) may thus be meaningfully established. Only 
也enwe shall fel more confident in explonng the nexus between opera-
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Table 2: DIMENSIONS OF OPERATIONAL CODE BELIEF SYSTEMS 
(Varimax rotated factor matrix: N~92) 
Polky 
Op<imi田／ Strategy Risks C=p•<ibili<y U.S. Policy Timing of 
Pessi皿＂圃 aod T旨cUo Calc.ulati白n of goa1' Calculation Actio回
"・ 』，02 ー.02 01 °' 11 °' 'ib 02 .oc ー.07 ー.04 .00 一.01
'io .10 .01 10 .21 .16 .14 
"' .03 ー.05 。 ，ー13 一.17 ,04 '1, 01 ー.06 -09 11 .so ー.29
'u 20 32 ー.01 19 ー.04 ，ー05
'1, .OS ニユ主 -14 .17 ・.09 .05 
'1h .40~ 27 ー.06 ，ー09 .24 .10 
"' 自 19 05 43 ー.06 04 21 '1J 03 -15 14 ー.19 74 15 
"・ .66 " 17 ー.04 .06 ，ー02"b .11 06 38 .20 .04 ~ 
'zo -'"- 』，02 21 14 07 ー.10
"' 46 自 .24 ー.12 39 ，ー02 04 "・ 17 17 .01 -42 21 .03 : 18 ー.12 -15 一.22 ー.09 』.15on 05 -12 ,09 02 .07 , 
ー.05 02 ・，OJ ”.09 .13 一.03
'i. 11 10 24 11 ー.09 .11 
1lb .09 57 "' 15 ー.09 ,01 'io 06 『.04 11 .69 』.04 .11 
'2. 09 -52 12 12 .06 .01 
12b 31 11 ー.02 13 04 一.21
1,. .06 ー 08 .64 -09 ー.07 『，16
IJh 24 45 06 02 .on ，ー11
!Jo -.02 08 60 ー.13 .19 ー.21
'" .00 14 10 07 14 04 1, .03 ー.01 ー.06 10 OS 79 
1sa 08 .08 01 ．ー日4 41 16 
1sh 26 08 ー.14 ー.04 ー.13 .28 
Eigenvalue 2.90 2.59 2.20 2.18 " 1.67 Percent of 9 7 8.6 7 .3 7 3 6.2 5.6 Variance 
• Loadinga oqnal <o O< gm<•< <ban 0.30 am nndodinod, 
Cont’d -
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'.I'abl阜 2: Cont’d 
Nature of Natm:e of Conti-al of Control of Small Paver 
Politics Conflict Undo"•king• His to可 Strategy 
pl• 53 17 07 .ー14 11 
plb 13 6B 02 .06 09 
pk 30 -01 39 .13 37 
pld 立主 .ーOl l2 .09 ’・06
"・ .20 .OS .ー29 10 l3 plf .20 24 ・°' 25 10 
plg .Ol ・ー＂ ・" 23 27 】＇1h .ー03 .12 .Ol 17 .ー08
pli .OS .07 』，06 02 .14 
:; .19 .ー02 .09 07 .12 ー.Ol .07 .08 06 .ー03
p2b .03 ，ー02 .03 07 .ー14
p2o .oi 司 .04 .04 -.16 .20 
p2d .ー06 ，ー26 .ー19 .ー23 .19 
"・ -.32 -.21 .21 .14 .ー06"b 司 .33 .ー03 l6 47 .07 
"・ .ー03 .04 .48 .03 06 P4 .ーOS .09 .ーOl .75 .ー04
'i. .11 .ー02 ・.02 .06 .41 
11b .ー03 .14 14 .ー01 .14 
Ik 』.06 ・.07 11 .ー09 01 
12a .ーOl .00 12 .oo 24 
12b 36 .16 07 .ー19 .ー03
r,, ーl3 -01 05 .ー11 .07 
I3b .12 .ー29 ~ .02 ・，04
1,, 14 .ー24 .ー09 .05 .12 
'" .ー11 -08 .ー03 .04 .60 r, 03 02 .Ol -09 .07 
'sa .12 .43 .20 07 開 .26
's• l9 23 .21 15 .OS 
Eig•回alu• 1.51 1.33 1.31 1 29 1.08 
E邑rcentof s.o 4.4 
Variance 
4.4 4.3 3.6 
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Notes 
(!) One outstandmg exception 1s the recent effort by Holsti (1977) to 
develop a typology of operational code belief systems Holsti, 
however, has not hypothesized linkages between al beliefs; neither 
has he hypothesized possible d1mens10ns of the belief systems. 
(2) The parenthesis indicates the continuum of the ques!Ion, it ranges 
from pomt I (ie., the left end of the scale) to point 7 (i e., the 
right end of the scale). 
(3) The score for this belief is obtained from the average score of three 
separate questions concerning the three different conditions for 
world peace respectively This is justified on the ground that 
results from the three separate questwns concerning world peace 
are strongly interrelated (correlation coefficients equal to or 
greater than .5 0); s1m1larly, other quest10ns address mg different 
aspects of largely identical beliefs have been combined and aver” 
aged. 
( 4)The score for this belief is obtained from the average score of six 
separate scales addressing the six policy goals respectively These 
policy goals were announced officially by the Trudeau government 
in 1970 as guidelines for Canadian foreign policies See Foreign 
Policy for cσnadzans, published by the Department of External 
Affairs, Ottawa, 1970 
(5) The白fthcategory of philosophic叫 beliefs(i.e., the last question 
concerning about the role of chance m human affairs and hzstory) 
originally suggested by George is re-classified and subsumed under 
the third category. 
( 6)The score for this belief 1s obtained from the average score of two 
separate questions concerning the importance of timing for long-
term goals and specific undertakings respectively. 
(7) Another recent study on Canadian elite images was conducted in 
1976 by Peter Lyon and his a田oc1at田 (1977).
(8) The initial questionnaires to Ottawa-based FSO were followed up 
by a second mailmg of ques!Ionnaires; there were no follow-up 
mailings of questionnaires to FSO serving abroad due to msuf-
f1cient research funds This explams the discrepancy of response 
rate between Ottawa-based FSO and those servmg abroad. lnsuf-
ficient follow up mailmgs of questionnaires also partly account for 
the over al low response rate 
(9) For attitudinal studies of this kind, with a sample size close to one 
hundred, linkages with correlation coefficient equal to or greater 
than 0.30 could be considered as strong 
(IO) This relationship could be stated reversely: when one perceives 
polil!cal life as basically harmoruous one tends to perceive the m-
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ternat10nal system as basically harmo血ous.For the sake of simpli-
city, however, the following ・discussion on correlations, with few 
exceptions, indicates only one end of the scale. 
(I I) The “vanmax”cnterion centers on sunphfymg血ecolumns of a 
factor matrix; it is equivalent to maximizing the variance of the 
squared loadings m each column. Factor patterns produced by the 
technique of oblique rotations are similar to those produced by 
the vanmax orthogonal rotations. This is due to msi即uficantcorre 
lations ・among factors. This paper thus presents only matnx from 
varimax. orthogonal rotation. 
(I 2) Loadings equal to or greater than 0.30 are generally considered as 
sigruficant and hence reported in this paper. 
(I 3) Admittedly, this is not the best research strategy for investigatmg 
the impact of environment and role on a person’s perceptions; 
more reliable and valid results would be obtained by examining the 
same individuals over several periods of time while working under 
different environments and roles Results from the present re-
search strategy are hkely contaminated by variables other than 
environment and role The generation gap, for example, rather 
th剖1the role variable may explain better the different perceptions 
and beliefs between the senior and junior diplomats. Nevertheless, 
results from the present study suggest that one should not ignore 
the impact of environment and role while applying the operational 
code approach to the study of an actor’s perceptions and political 
behavior. 
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ハーノfー 卜 S イー
本研究は「オベレーショナJレ コード」という信念体系の相関と次元
を探るものである。 「オベレーショナル コード」という概念は，初めに
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いこと，また信念を独立変数群として考察すると，個人のオベレ ショ
ナル・コードの様々な次元が特定の政策問題に対するその個人の態度の
大まかな予測変数群として用いられることを見い出した。
